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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State appeals the District Court's reversal of the Magistrate's denial of the 
Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. The District Court found that the 
State failed to prove the Defendant committed any act enumerated in I.C. § 18-6409 thereby 
failing to prove the alleged crime of Violation of a Protection Order by disturbing the peace of 
the protected party. This Court should affirm the District Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Brian Pierce was charged on June 7, 2013 by Criminal Complaint with VIOLATION OF 
A PROTECTION ORDER, misdemeanor, pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-6312. (R. pp. 11-12). 
The Complaint alleged that Mr. Pierce violated a domestic violence protection order entered in 
Canyon County Case No. CV-2013-4533-C by "turning off the utilities at the residence where 
Michelle Pierce," the protected party, resided. Id. According to the complaint, this disturbed the 
peace of Ms. Pierce, thus violating the protection order. Id. An Amended Criminal Complaint, 
was filed on September 16, 2013, the day before trial. (R. pp. 34-35). The amended complaint 
added Ms. Pierce's children as victims and language that Mr. Pierce knew that his alleged 
conduct was prohibited by the protection order. Id. The alleged conduct did not change from the 
original Complaint. Id. 
A jury trial was held on September 17, 2013 before the Honorable Magistrate Dayo 
Onanubosi. (R. p. 36). At trial, the State presented evidence to show Mr. Pierce had called utility 
companies to turn off some utilities at Ms. Pierce's residence. (Tr., p. 110, Ls. 1-5). Further, the 
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State presented evidence showing several inconveniences that Ms. Pierce and her children 
experienced following the shut-offs and that the deactivated utilities were in Mr. Pierce's name. 
(Tr., p.118, L.6 p.121, L. 22; p.122, L.21 p.126, L. 4). Following the State's case, the 
Defense moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29, which was 
denied. (Tr., p.132, L. I p.135, L.4). The Defense did not present any witnesses at trial. Prior to 
closing arguments, a conference was held outside the presence of the jury regarding the closing 
instructions. (Tr., p.136, L. 18 p.145, L.17). There were no objections to any of the closing 
instructions, outside of the State's objection to the use of the word "willful" in Instruction 204. 
Id. That objection was overruled by the Court. Id. The closing instructions were read to the jury, 
closing arguments were presented by both parties and the jury began deliberating. (Tr., p.146, 
L.13-p.159, L.5). 
During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court regarding the meaning of 
Instruction 204. (Tr., p.159, L. 22 p.162, L.15). Despite the confusion, the Court and counsel 
agreed no further instructions would be provided to the jury, and no clarification was offered. Id 
The jury then returned a guilty verdict in this case. (Tr., p. 163, L.3 11). 
Following the guilty verdict, the defense renewed its Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 
filed Sept. 23, 2013. (R., pp.50-52). The State filed an Objection to Rule 29 Motion on Oct. 2, 
2013. (R., pp.53-56). On October 3, 2013 a hearing was held on the renewed motion, both parties 
presenting argument. (R., p.57; and Tr., pp. 171 -186). The Magistrate denied the Defendant's 
motion, however, he expressed significant concern about whether the State had actually proven 
an act that amounted to disturbing the peace. (Tr., p.173, L.24 p.181, L.5). The case was then 
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set for sentencing on January 16, 2014, and a Judgment of Conviction was entered on that date. 
(R., p.64). Mr. Pierce filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2014. (R., pp.65-67). Mr. 
Pierce filed an Appellant's Brief on July 15, 2014 in support of his position that the District 
Court should vacate his conviction. The State filed a brief in opposition on August 11, 2014. The 
District Court found that the Magistrate had committed error by denying the motion for acquittal, 
acquitted Mr. Pierce and dismissed the charges. (Memorandum Decision, filed Dec. 2, 2014, R., 
pp. 70-85). The State now appeals the District Court's decision. 
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ISSUES 
I. Whether 'disturbing the peace' is in fact a term of art, as affirmed by the District Court 
on appeal. 
2. Whether it was proper for the District Court to enter an acquittal after finding the state 
failed to prove that the Mr. Pierce committed any of the acts enumerated in l.C. § 18-
6409, which defines 'disturbing the peace.' 
3. Whether the District Court could have vacated the judgment and entered an acquittal 




The State contends that it did not have to prove an act enumerated in LC. § 18-6409 
because it charged Mr. Pierce with violating a protection order under l.C. § 39-6312; therefore, 
the District Court abused its discretion by vacating the judgment on those grounds. However, this 
argument ignores the fact that the State charged Mr. Pierce with violating a protection order by 
'disturbing the peace' because he called and had utilities shut off at the protected parties home. 
(R. p. 35). By alleging Mr. Pierce violated the order by 'disturbing the peace,' the State made the 
meaning of' disturbing the peace' vitally important. 
The District Court recognized that disturbing the peace is a tenn of art that has a distinct 
meaning in the law, and that the meaning is given in I.C. § 18-6409. The District Judge referred 
to that code section and found that it enumerated specific acts that are considered disturbing the 
peace. Calling to have a home's utilities shut-off is not one of the enumerated acts, and because 
of that the District Judge properly vacated the judgment because the State did not prove an 
enumerated act. Additionally, the State alleged no other basis for violating the order other than 
disturbing the peace of the protected parties, so there were grounds for the judgment to stand. 
Finally, even if the State's assertion is correct (i.e. that it did not have to prove an act enumerated 
in I.C. § 18-6409) the District Court was still correct because the protection order in this case is 
unconstitutionally vague and could not be enforced because the phrase "disturbed the peace" is 
ambiguous and did not notify Mr. Pierce what he was prohibited from doing. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When rev1ew111g a decision of a district court acting 111 its appellate capacity, the 
reviewing court directly reviews the district court's decision. State v. Loomis, 146 Idaho 700, 
702, 201 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2009). A district court has authority to set aside a conviction and 
enter judgment of acquittal if the evidence is not sufficient to sustain a conviction pursuant to 
I.C.R. 29. State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542,348 P.3d 157, 161 (2015). When reviewing a district 
court's decision to vacate a judgment the reviewing court's "inquiry is not whether it would find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 'but whether after viewing evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. quoting, State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 
460,272 P.3d 417,432 (2012). 
The only inquiry then is "whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
jury could have found the state met its burden of proving the essentially elements" of the crime 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Substantial evidence means a "reasonable trier of fact would 
accept it and rely on it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. State v. 
Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 4, 333 P.3d 112, 115 (2014). While reviewing a decision to vacate a 
judgment pursuant to l.C.R. 29, the reviewing court will exercise free review over questions of 
law. See id. 
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES 
There are two major issues that must be addressed in this case, with two subparts to one 
of the main issues. First, is whether the District Court properly affim1ed the magistrate's ruling 
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that 'disturbing the peace' is a term of art. Second, is whether the District Court properly 
exercised its discretion by vacating the judgment in this case and entering an acquittal. The 
second issue gives rise the following sub issues: (I) whether the District Court was correct in 
vacating the judgement because the State failed to prove any act enumerated in I.C. § 18-6409; 
and (2) whether the District Court could have also vacated on the grounds the order was 
unconstitutionally vague. An analysis of these issues is provided below. 
I. The Magistrate correctly exercised its discretion by ruling "disturbing the peace" is 
a term of art, and the District Court was correct in affirming that decision. 
The Appellant's argument addresses a relevant issue in this case, but in doing so it 
ignores a very important preliminary issue that must be addressed. Namely, whether or not 
'disturbing the peace' is a term of art. The Magistrate ruled that 'disturbing the peace' is a term 
of art, and the District Court properly affirmed this decision. (R. p. 72). This issue is important 
because the Appellant has argued that it was improper for the District Court to vacate the 
conviction based upon the judge's determination that the elements of I.C. § 18-6409, the 
statutory provision for the crime of 'disturbing the peace,' had not been met. Thus, whether or 
not the District Court was correct in relying on that statute rests in part on the determination 
whether or not 'disturbing the peace' is a term of art. 
As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, a tern1 of art is "[a] word or phrase having a 
specific, precise meaning in a given specialty apart from its meaning in ordinary contexts." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) available at Westlaw BLACKS. "Where words are 
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law 
of this country they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to 
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the contrary. See State v. Oar. 129 Idaho 337, 340, 924 P.2d 599, 602 (1996), quoting, Lori! lard 
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,583, 98 S.Ct. 866,871, 55 L.Ed.2d 40, 47 (1978). 
'Disturbing the peace' is a phrase that is ambiguous on its own and has no precise 
meaning without reference to some definition. It denotes some type of act or acts, yet the act or 
acts it denotes are not so unique that one can readily identify an act as disturbing the peace when 
they observe it. For example, one can readily identify the act of striking another with a closed fist 
as a "punch," or the act two people connecting their lips as a "kiss." These are unambiguous acts 
that need little explanation to understand or label. However, there is no such unique act that one 
can observe and readily identify as 'disturbing the peace.' 
'Disturbing the peace' is a term that is recognized within a specialty, namely the law, and 
has a specific meaning because the law has assigned it a specific meaning. The words employed 
in I.C. § 18-6409 give this phrase meaning it otherwise lacks. LC. § 18-6409 is admittedly a 
criminal statute and not merely a definitional statute, but it is the source in Idaho law that 
provides meaning to this term. Further, the meaning embodied in this statute may even conflict 
with the presumed meaning of 'disturbing the peace' in ordinary contexts. For example, 
following the close of the State's case in this trial, the Magistrate referenced the meaning of 
'disturbing the peace' by reading its statutory definition. (Tr. p. 138 L. 20 - p. 134 L. 7). At this 
point in the case, the meaning of this tern1 of art was stated accurately. However, a few weeks 
later when Mr. Pierce renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, the Magistrate incorrectly 
stated the meaning of 'disturbing the peace' and concluded the definition is a catch-all for 
offensive conduct. (Tr. 1 78 L. 20 - p. 179 L. 20). This misstatement by the Magistrate shows 
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that without reference to the codified meaning of this term of art, it is easy assume the meaning 
is different in ordinary contexts. Nothing about the context of this case suggested that some other 
meaning should be assumed. 
In conclusion, 'disturbing the peace' is in fact a term of art because it has been assigned a 
unique meaning because it has been assigned meaning within a specialty, namely the law, and 
that meaning is different than it might be in ordinary contexts. The only question remains now in 
this appeal is whether it was proper for the District Court to vacate the judgment in this case. 
II. It was a proper use of discretion by the District Court to vacate the judgment and 
reverse the magistrate's denial of the I.C.R. Rule 29 motion for acquittal on multiple 
grounds. 
By including "disturbed the peace" in the complaint, the State made it an absolute 
necessity for that phrase to be defined. (R. p. 35). The State asserts in the amended complaint 
that shutting off utilities is the act that "disturbed the peace" in this case in an apparent effort to 
define the ambiguous phrase. Id However, how the State came up with that definition is unclear 
because neither the protection order itself nor any known statutory provision suggests calling to 
have utilities turned off is an act of disturbing the peace. While utility companies may applaud 
the State's efforts to make an individual forever financially responsible for utilities they ever 
dared to have activated, such an act comes nowhere close to an act of 'disturbing the peace.' 
Because the State's charging decision, it became necessary to reference some source to give 
meaning to the phrase "disturbed the peace." Id. 
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a. The District Court properly reversed the Magistrate's denial of the Rule 29 after 
concluding the State failed to provide evidence Mr. Pierce committed any enumerated 
act in I. C. § 18-6409. 
After concluding 'disturbing the peace' is a term of art, the District Court properly relied 
on I.C. § 18-6409 to provide meaning to that phrase because that statute enumerates acts the 
legislature has already codified as acts that amount to disturbing the peace. Essentially, 
'disturbing the peace' needed to be defined, so the District Court looked to statute to define it. 
LC. § 18-6409( I) reads as follows: 
DISTURBING THE PEACE. (I) Every person who maliciously and willfully 
disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or 
unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, 
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or 
uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language within the presence or hearing of 
children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
This code section enumerates specific acts that rise to the level of' disturbing the peace,' and is 
not merely a catch-all for any offensive conduct. The act of shutting off utilities is not included 
as an enumerated act in the statute. Further, shutting off utilities-even under the most strained 
reading of this statute-can't be considered a subcategory of one of these enumerated acts. Once 
the District Court found the meaning of the term of art used in the amended complaint, it was 
proper to vacate the judgement because the State did not prove any enumerated act of 'disturbing 
the peace.' 
By way of explanation, State v. Schulz demonstrates how the true meaning of a term of 
art can impact a criminal charge. 151 Idaho 863, 264 P.3d 970 (20 I I). In Schulz, the defendant 
was charged with the crimes of domestic battery and attempted strangulation for acts he 
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allegedly committed on his 15-year-old daughter. Id. at 971, 864. The State succeeded in filing 
this charge by including the 15-year-old daughter within the definition of "household member." 
Id. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the victim, namely 
his child, is not included in the statutory meaning of "household member." Id. at 865, 972. The 
state countered and argued that "household member" "unambiguously includes anyone living 
together." Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion. Id. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court detennined the state was trying to include the defendant's child within the term 
"household member" because that definition includes ''a person with whom the person is 
cohabitating." Id. at 866, 973, quoting, J.C. § 18-9 l 8( 1 )(a). However, the Court also concluded 
that '" cohabitating' is a long-recognized term of art plainly denoting an intimate relationship." 
Id. at 867, 974. As such, a child is not included within the meaning of "household member:' and 
the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of both charges. Id. 
Unlike Schulz, nobody realized the full significance of the use of the term of art 
'disturbing the peace' until on appeal to the District Court. The trial record for this case is full of 
examples that show the Magistrate, Defense Counsel, and the Prosecuting Attorney realized that 
the phrase 'disturbing the peace' had some significant meaning, but they never quite pinned the 
meaning down, or figured out the effect the meaning had on the case. For example: 
l. Before trial started the Magistrate began asking both parties questions about the 
importance of showing willful intent. Later the Magistrate even refers to malicious 
behavior. Both words are intent elements which appear in I.C. § 18-6409. Why the 
Magistrate began this line of questioning isn't entirely clear, but the Magistrate's 
insistence on the requirement that the State show willful behavior seems to indicate 
he recognizes the connection of this case to the definition in I.C. § 18-6409. See Tr. p. 
l8L.5 p.37Tr.18). 
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2. Following the close of the State's case, Mr. Pierce moved for entry of acquittal based 
upon the State's failure to show willful intent. (Tr. p. 133 L. 1 - L. 12). During 
argument on this motion the Magistrate asked the State whether they were trying to 
show that shutting off utilities amounts to an act of disturbing the peace. (Tr. p. 133 
L.11 L.18.)Theprosecutingattorneyreplied,"Yes, YourHonor."(Tr.133L.19 
( emphasis added)). This concession by the State that appeared to trigger in the 
Magistrate's mind the significance of placing 'disturbing the peace' in the complaint, 
and the Magistrate then read I.C. § 18-6409 on the record. (Tr. p. 133 L. 20 p. 134 
L. 7). Despite this series of events, the Magistrate did not grant the motion for 
acquittal. (Tr. p. 133 L. 8 - p. 134 L. 5). 
3. In settling the final jury instructions, the Magistrate concluded that it was going to 
place the word "willfully" into paragraph four of Instruction 204. (Tr. p. 138 L. l 0 
L. 15). This addition of the word willfully suggests that the Magistrate comprehended 
that charging a civil protection order violation by 'disturbing the peace' should in fact 
change the nature of the instructions given to the jury. But how they should change 
was not entirely realized. The State objected to the change in the pattern instruction 
for a civil protection order violation, but the Magistrate still made the modification. 
(Tr. p. 142 L. 20 p. 144 L. 12). 
Due to the apparent confusion of the Magistrate and counsel regarding the full effect of 
the term of art used in the complaint, Jury Instruction 204--which was the elements instruction 
for the crime-went to the jury in a wholly incomprehensible format. When discussing 
Instruction 204 in its memorandum, the District Court said: 
The charging instruction is wrong. The grammatical construction of the fourth 
element awkwardly attempts to put three concepts for the jury to decide into one 
sentence: (1) did or did not the state prove that the defendant shut off the utility in 
question, which act (2) did nor [sic] did not constitute a breach of the peace of the 
protected person, and (3) which the defendant did or did not willfully intended 
[sic] to breach ... The sentence could be read to mean that the court has already 
determined that shutting off the utility was a breach of the peace, and the only 
thing to be decided is whether the defendant intended or knew of the 
consequences. The instruction set as a whole was wrong in that it did not include 
an instruction defining what would be necessary to find the acts in question did 
constitute disturbing the peace something to relate the acts in question to the 
elements contained in the statute, I.C. § 18-6409. (R. p. 74). 
12 
The trial record shows that the jury was in fact confused by the instruction because it sent a 
question to the Magistrate asking for clarification as to what it was supposed to decide. (Tr. p. 
159 L. 22 - p. 160 L. 7). Despite the confusion, the Magistrate and counsel agreed to offer no 
clarification, and the jury was left to make a decision based on an incomprehensible instruction. 
(Tr. p. 161 L. 24-p. 161 L. 9). 
RefeITing back to Schulz, the court in that case dismissed after they concluded the true 
meaning of the term of art 'household member' excludes a defendant's children. Thus, the 
defendant couldn't be charged with domestic battery and attempted strangulation for acts 
committed on his daughter. Similarly, had the Magistrate here comprehended the true meaning 
of 'disturbing the peace '-and realized its effect in this case-the motion for acquittal would 
have been granted because shutting off utilities is not an enumerated act in I.C. § 18-6409. 
Unfortunately, the motion was denied. During the trial, the Magistrate obviously grappled with 
the charging language and jury instructions, but in the midst of the stress and myriad of decisions 
a Magistrate makes in trial he was unable to pin down how to resolve the dilemma of using 
'disturbing the peace' in the complaint and jury instruction. The Magistrate's frustration is best 
exemplified by the following statement made when he denied the Defendant's renewed motion 
for acquittal: 
There is a lot about this case that is ... unease for me and one has to question 
whether or not I think it's a reasonably inquire actually whether or not the 
action engaged by Mr. Pierce rises to the level of or tantamount to disturbing the 
peace. Tr. p. 178 L. 20 L. 24. 
13 
fortunately, the District Court was able to review the events and decisions made at trial and use 
his discretion to correct an error. It was proper for the District Court to vacate the conviction 
where the State failed to provide evidence Mr. Pierce committed any enumerated act in J.C. § 18-
6409, thus Mr. Pierce could not have disturbed the peace. Because the District Court exercised 
its discretion properly, its decision should be affirmed. 
b. It was proper for the District Court to vacate the judgment because 'disturbing the 
peace' is an ambiguous phrase, and its inclusion within the protection order 
without a definition caused the order to be unconstitutionally vague. 
In addition to the foregoing argument, it was proper for the District Court to vacate the 
judgment in this case and enter an acquittal because the civil protection order was 
unconstitutionally vague. More specifically, including the phrase "disturb the peace" in the order 
without defining that term caused the order to be unconstitutionally vague. Mr. Pierce could not 
review the order and reasonably be expected to know that a prohibition against disturbing the 
peace meant he couldn't tum off utilities to avoid the financial responsibility for those utilities. 
This basis for dismissal isn't specifically argued by the District Court, but is nonetheless 
included because if I.C. § 18-6409 is not referenced to define 'disturbing the peace,' than the 
phrase remains ambiguous. 
"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined." Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 
2294, 2298 (1972) To withstand a constitutional challenge for vagueness a statute must place 
citizens, of average intelligence, on notice of "what the State commands or forbids," and should 
not force individuals to guess what is meant by the statute. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 
14 
96 7 P.2d 244, 246 (! 998). Where a violation of the statute results in a criminal penalty a more 
exacting test for vagueness is applied. Id. An ordinance must provide ·'sufficient guidelines to 
prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 589, 789 P.2d 43, 
48 ( 1990). Although this case involves a Court's order rather than a statute, the analysis is the 
same because violation of the order in this case amount to a violation of I.C. § 39-6312. Where, 
as here, a person is subject to criminal penalties as a result of an order, due process requires that 
there be notice of prohibited conduct so that individuals can modify their conduct to comply with 
the order. If an order is unclear and does not define prohibited conduct, then the order is 
unconstitutionally vague. (See, e.g. analysis at, United States v. Loy, 23 7 F .3d 251, 261-62 (3d 
Cir. 200 I)). 
In U.S. v. Loy, the defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography, and it was 
ordered as a condition of the defendant's probation that he be prohibited from possessing "all 
forms of pornography, including legal adult pornography." 237 F.3d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2001). 
The Comi held that the prohibition on pornography was unconstitutionally vague. (Id. at 254.) 
The prohibition was unconstitutionally vague because pornography lacks a legal definition and 
does not place the defendant on notice what materials are prohibited. (Id. at 264.) The court 
further explained that the defendant "can hardly be expected to be able to discern, in advance, 
which materials are prohibited, with no more than the constitutional standard of permissible 
restrictions to guide him." Id. 
In the instant case, "disturbing the peace" was not defined in the order issued by the 
Magistrate, nor in the statute authorizing the order, even though 'disturbing the peace' was 
15 
specifically prohibited conduct in the order. Just as the defendant in Loy was left to guess at the 
meaning of 'pornography,' so too was Mr. Pierce left to guess at the meaning of 'disturb the 
peace.' Both defendants were also subject to criminal sanctions for their failure to comply with 
these vague court orders. Since Mr. Pierce could not reasonably have been expected to 
understand what conduct was prohibited by the protection order's restriction against 'disturbing 
the peace,' he cannot be held subject to criminal penalties because the order was 
unconstitutionally vague. 
CONCLUSION 
'Disturbing the peace' is a term of art. Because it is a term of art, reference to its legal 
definition is essential to understand what the term means. Due to not realizing the significance of 
this tern1 and how to use it, the Magistrate committed a reversible error by not granting the 
motion for acquittal. The District Court's decision to vacate the conviction was proper because 
the State failed to provide evidence that Mr. Pierce committed any act enumerated in l.C. § I 8-
6409. Additionally, the District Court could have found that the civil protection order was 
unconstitutionally vague because it prohibited 'disturbing the peace' without defining that 
ambiguous phrase. Because of the vagueness Mr. Pierce could not be subject to criminal 
penalties for violating an incomprehensible order. Therefore, because the District Court correctly 
resolved an error committed at the Magistrate level, the Respondent requests this Court affirm 
that decision. 
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DA TED this 2nd day of October, 2015. 
Marc Bybee, Deputy Public Defender 
Attorney for the Defendant-Respondent 
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